Forward air control during the Vietnam War

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The forward air controller (FAC) played an important role in the Vietnam War from the beginning. Much of it was degraded into aerial tasks by forest field constraints, the FAC began operating as early as 1962. Using propane propelled aircraft and inadequate radio nets, they became extremely important for air operations that the overall need for FAC would not be fully satisfied until 1969. FAC as an air raid controller also makes it a source of intelligence, ammunition, communications specialist, and above all, the on-scene commander of the strike force and the beginning of the search and rescue of the next war if necessary.

Present as an advisor under the Agricultural Gate, FAC grew increasingly important as US troops entered Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin Inc. The US Air Force (USAF) would swell its FAC complement to as many as 668 FACs in Vietnam in 1968; there are also FACs from the US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps, and cognate countries. For the early years of the war, the USAF drill rate was about 70% of the need; they finally reached 100% in December 1969. FAC will be an important participant in close air support in South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Trail ban, supporting guerrilla warfare on the Jars Plain in Laos, and investigating house defenses in Northern Vietnam.

When the war came to the center on the Trail in 1969, the role of FAC began to be marginalized. The anti-aircraft defense (AAA) is becoming increasingly aggressive and threatening along the Strip as the North Vietnamese bombing closes. Communist enemies move their supply activities into the night, literally leaving FAC in the dark. America's response is twofold. They use fixed wing guns with electronic sensors to detect communist trucks, and onboard weapons to destroy them. They also began placing FAC on jet planes and on board as counter to AAA threats. At almost the same time, the coated ground sensors began to complement and overshadow FAC surveillance as a source of intelligence. The FAC ammunition guides also started playing in 1970.

By the time the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the US and its allies had dropped about six times as many tons of bombs as it had been dropped in the whole of World War II. Much of this tonnage has been directed by the air handler forward.

Video Forward air control during the Vietnam War

Lingkungan pengoperasian Forward Air Controller

Medan operasi

The Forward Air Controller (FAC) fulfilled many tasks during the Second Indochina War. In addition to the usual near-air support mission strike to help the South Vietnamese ground troops in their fight against rebels backed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, he may direct a search and rescue operation or air strike attack on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Other FAC tasks include convoy supply truck escorts, or engagement in covert operations. The FAC also advises field commanders on the use of air force, and trains indigenous personnel in air control forwards. Most importantly, he flies a visual reconnaissance mission, searching for information about the enemy.

Airborne FAC flies Cessna O-1 Bird Dog or other light aircraft slowly over rough terrain at low altitudes to maintain constant air surveillance. By patrolling in the same area constantly, FAC grew very familiar with the terrain, and they learned to detect any changes that could indicate the enemy forces hiding below. The lush jungle fields of Southeast Asia easily conceal enemy troop movements. However, the FAC searched for footprints on the ground, dust settled in the foliage, turbulent waters in the river - all signs of enemy movement furtively. Both the unexpected flow of bonfires and the ranks of fresh vegetables growing near water in "uninhabited" areas are also tip-offs to communist camps. However, the decoy camp is unknown; often fires are stored underground, with the smoke blob being diverted through a laterally extended chimney. The communist insurgents are clever in camouflage and disguise. Camouflage is extended until each soldier uses a green branch to decorate the backpack. As part of the disguise, the rebels sometimes dress as civilians, even go dressing like monks or as women carrying small children. In spite of this avoidance, in 1968, FAC visual reconnaissance has greatly suppressed the daytime communist activity.

Flying low and slow over enemy forces is very dangerous for the FAC; But the enemy usually holds the fire to avoid discovery. However, when the enemy fired a shot, it might hit him with anything from a rifle bullet to a 37mm anti-aircraft gun. A low pass for the assessment of post-strike bomb damage is another dangerous task.

FAC American soil began providing workplace training to Southern Vietnamese partners in the Tactical Airborne Contract, in an effort to improve poor performance by local FACs. However, heavy terrain, limited sight lines, and difficulties in communication always hinder FAC efforts in Southeast Asia.

FAC aircraft used

A wide variety of planes are used in the front air control role.

Propelled aircraft by

FAC aircraft powered by common propellers are:

• Cessna O-1: These two seats serve as the original FAC aircraft. Slow, unarmed and unarmed, its small size limits its charge and has no instrumentation for night operations. Although it carries three radios for coordinating air strikes - Frequency Modulation, High Frequency, and Very High Frequency - only one radio channel is available at a time.

• Skymaster Cessna O-2: 510 was modified for military service. The aircraft of an entrepreneur, it was adapted for temporary use by FAC, to replace the O-1. It was a faster plane, with two engines in a tractor/pusher arrangement, four hard points for weaponry, and seven hours of lingering time. Seating side by side limits the pilot's view lane to the right and back.

• OV-10 Bronco: The first American aircraft designed for FAC work; entered combat service on July 6, 1968. By doubling the speed of O-1, an excellent overall line of sight for observation, armored cockpit, and avionics that included eight safe radios along with aviation instruments, five percent percent OV-10 point-points hard making it a powerful combination of FAC aircraft and light strikes. In 1972, Bronco was responsible for shining laser targets for about 60% of the "smart bombs" that fell in Vietnam.

Other propeller aircraft are also used as FAC aircraft, usually in interim, ad hoc, or special roles:

• Cessna U-17 Skywagon
• T-28 Trojan North America
• A-26 Invader
• A-1 Skyraider
• OV-1 Mohawk
• Fairchild AC-119
• C-123 Provider: "Candlestick" call alert
• C-130 Hercules: "Blindbat" call alert
• Douglas RC-47P
• C-7 Caribou

FAC fast jet aircraft

Jet plane is also used for FAC tasks:

• Grumman F-9 Cougar: Used by the U.S. Marine Corps as the original Fast FAC experiment
• F-100 Super Saber: "Misty" call alert
• McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II: Signs of "Stormy", "Wolf", "Night Owl", "Whiplash/Laredo" calls
• Martin B-57 Canberra

Engagement rule

The Rules of Engagement (ROE) places restrictions on the use and direction of air strikes. In 1961, when the American and FAC pilots of South Vietnam began flying combat missions together, the first ROE was established. The preliminary requirement is that only the Vietnamese FAC can drop the weaponry because all air strikes require the approval of the South Vietnamese government. In addition, the plane can return fire if fired, in what is dubbed "armed reconnaissance".

On January 25, 1963, ROE was renewed to establish several fire-free zones containing only enemy troops; permission is not required to place air strikes there. Requirements for Vietnam's approval were also lifted for night missions in favor of troops in touch, as long as they were supported by the Douglas C-47 jet aircraft. In 1964, ROE had changed to allow US Army aircraft to observe from as low as 50 feet, while USAF and VNAF held to a minimum of 500 feet. As the war evolves, so does ROE; they become complicated. Branches are different from military service - US. Air Force, US Army, US Marine Corps, US Navy - fly under different rules. For example, the requirements for Vietnam's on-board FAC are waived for FAC US Army. On March 9, 1965, US air was cleared to attack in South Vietnam with domestically placed aircraft; but Thai-based bombers are banned from hitting South Vietnamese targets.

The rules change according to the location of the action and the power involved. Only USAF FAC can support US Army ground forces in South Vietnam, unless the Army operates in free fire zones. And while the military approves air strikes in Vietnam, any target approval in Laos depends on the American ambassador.

General for all iterations of ROE is the insistence on aligning attacks so that weapons are dropped or fired away from friendly troops and innocent civilians, and against enemy troops. Superb circumstances may find the FAC limited to direct the parallel drop to the friendly line. Only in the urgent circumstances that the FAC decision approves the strike in the direction towards the friendly troops. ROE is also clear that, not how junior is in the FAC rankings, he completely controls air strikes. Inattentive or disobedient pilots are sometimes asked to bring their bombs back to the base. There is anecdotal evidence that a "friendly fire" incident was reported to the US President.

A remarkable example of civilian FAC safety occurred on February 8, 1968. Several hundred refugees moving on Route 9 from Khe Sanh to Lang Vei avoided artillery attacks when Captain Charles Rushforth identified them as non-military targets.

Staff personnel test FAC on Rules on a monthly basis. FAC may have to master more than one set of ROE. The complexity of the Rules, and the aggravation of adjusting to them, were the main recruiters for FAC Raven working in Laos.

Advanced air control system

In many cases, the front air control system begins with an advanced air controller given an initial guidance on the target. He then planned his attack mission. In other cases, the demand for air coming soon requires a quick response; FAC may have to divert from pre-directed targets. In any case, the FAC will meet with the strike aircraft, preferably from the targeted enemy's view. Once the verification permission is verified, FAC marks the target, usually with a smoke rocket. After the plane strikes identify the marked targets, they are directed by FAC. After the strike is over, FAC will make a bomb damage assessment and report it.

FAC is the most important link in any of the air control systems; in one of them he serves as a center for strike attempts. He is in radio contact not only with strike aircraft; he also spoke with the Air Command and Control Center that coordinated the availability of air strikes, to ground troops, and to the headquarters that approved the strike. He was backed by a Tactical Air Control Party in collaboration with ground troop headquarters beginning to descend to regimental, brigade, or battalion regimental levels. However, the diversity of the system, their lack of equipment, and the lack of participant experience, all hampered FAC in the Vietnam War.

In short, whether air or ground tied, FAC's expertise as aerial attack controller makes it a source of intelligence, ammunition, communications specialist, and above all, the on-scene commander of the strike force and the beginning of the next battle quest. and save if necessary.

Maps Forward air control during the Vietnam War

Operations in Vietnam

There were four focal points of anti-communist air operations during the Second Indochina War. Only two of the four focal points are located in Vietnam.

FAC Operations in South Vietnam

Before the Tonkin Bay Incident

The US Air Force had closed the FAC operation after the Korean War, in 1956. In 1961 he revived the doctrine and sent five fighter pilots as FAC to Bien Hoa Air Base at the Agriculture Gate contingent to advise and train the Republic of Vietnam Air Force ( VNAF) in directing air strikes from O-1 Bird Dogs. In the process, USAF reinvents the air forward and the Air Command. The rediscovery was complicated by the language and cultural difficulties between Americans and Vietnamese, the clash between different FAC procedures in both countries, and the South Vietnamese policy towards FAC. Inadequate radio and clash of four different communication procedures - US. Army, US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and VNAF - will disrupt efforts to standardize air control systems forward. Although all users agreed that the strike aircraft should be diverted from a pre-planned mission to supply close air support, the US Air Force, the US Army, and the Vietnamese military each followed a different new complex communication procedure for redirection. The US Air Force believes in a centralized top-down control system. The US Army voted decentralized. Vietnam has a more complex centralized system, and only trusts very few senior officers and officials to approve strikes. US Special Forces are sometimes forced to evade any system because of a terrible emergency. Marines continue their organic system of Marine flyers supporting Marine infantry.

The FACS situation is exacerbated by the most basic shortcomings and distribution of supplies. The 1957 inter-labor agreement laid down the supply responsibility for the FAC Air Force's US efforts to support the US Army in the Army. The latter is owned by O-1 Bird Dogs; both USAF and VNAF depend on transferring the aircraft to them. Neither the radio jeep nor the regular vehicles are available. Inventory is almost non-existent, and logistics systems are a nightmare. With the Army doing a poor supply job, USAF assumed responsibility, but logistical issues would play FAC until the end of the war.

In December 1961, the Tactical Air Control System established as part of the Gate of Agriculture effort began to handle air strike operations, including air forward air control. On December 8, 1961, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Commander of the newly re-established Airborne Command Group to attack communist rebels. On February 8, 1962, the Air Operation Center for Vietnam was established at Tan Son Nhut on the outskirts of Saigon; it will be the command and control of the network for air control forwards. In April 1962, a USAF study concluded that only 32 FAC Americans were required for Vietnamese services; at the last moment of the 32 has been set a year later, they are clearly not enough.

On April 14, 1962, VNAF began training Forward Air Guides (FAGs) as ground personnel to assist the air FAC. On 1 July 1962, 240 FAGs had been trained, but were authorized to direct air strikes only in case of an emergency. The FAGs are often misinterpreted in return of duty, and are rarely used in practice. FAG training programs are shrinking. At the same time, Americans are trying to "sell" the FAC concept that is placed as an Air License Officer at every Vietnam headquarters as an advisor on air power.

At night, the communist guerrillas will attack the detachment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops in remote hamlets. The Gate Air Farm Command improvised the FAC night procedure, using C-47s to drop flares, with T-28s or A-26 Invaders dive bombed under flares. Viet Cong ran these attacks. Finally, it only needs a communist first flare to break the attack.

In 1962, elements of the Marine Observation Squadron 2 landed at Soc Trang to join the efforts of air control in the future. The squadron will then shift from O-1 helicopter to UH-1 Huey. It was also in 1962 that the communists began to attack the convoys that propelled inventories in South Vietnam. A shadow truck convoy program with FAC O-1 begins; no hired replenishment columns were ambushed in early 1963.

As the war increases, Vietnam's military needs more FAC than it can train. The US Air Force responded by activating the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS 19) at Bien Hoa Air Base on June 17, 1963. Despite the shortage of chronic aircraft, vehicles and radios, the 19th TASS will survive in combat readiness. However, their effectiveness is limited by the fact that Vietnamese FACs are subjected to prosecution of any "friendly fire" incident. The 73d Aircraft Company of the US Army also commenced FAC's work at this time; they were somewhat more successful than the 19th TASS because the Army allowed surveillance from a lower altitude than the USAF.

After Tonkin Bay Incident

After the Gulf of Tonkin incident served as an American cassus belli in August 1964, the United States began to add a large number of ground forces requiring air support in South Vietnam. In January 1965, there were only 144 USAF Air FACs to support them; 76 of them are assigned as advisors. There are also 68 VNAF FACs, but only 38 aircraft, in the four Vietnamese connecting squadrons. But the Rules of Engagement mandated the front air controller directing all air strikes in South Vietnam. At this point, excessive air control missions begin to metastasize in response to events. On February 7, 1965, Viet Cong guerrillas attacked the Pleiku Airbase. On March 2, the US retaliated by starting a campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, to bomb North Vietnam. To streamline operations, FAC America was released from having to bring Vietnamese observers to validate its target on March 9. The Tiger Steel ban campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Demilitarized Zone began on April 3, 1965. In September 1965, the USAF Tactical Water Control Team (TACP) landed in Vietnam to begin the management of the FAC forces. TACPs are scheduled to be assigned one per battalion of maneuvers, one per brigade headquarters, and four per divisional headquarters.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler visited South Vietnam in the midst of all this, in March 1965. He saw the need for more FAC. Immediately upon his return to the United States, JCS authorized three more Tactical Air Support Squadron in June 1965.

In the midst of this buildup in a number of FACs, the first Airborne Command and Control Center was launched to serve as a relay between TACP and FAC pilots. ABCCC will become the nerve center of aviation from Vietnam's air war. It not only tracks all other aircraft, it functions "to ensure proper execution of the cut mission and to act as, a central control body in the transfer of strike power to a secondary and profitable target." ABCCC will develop into a twenty-four hour program per day that directs all air activity in the war.

As early as 1965, the USAF had realized that TACAN radar was an almost unnecessary need for bombing operations, due to the lack of reliable maps and other navigational aids. As a result, Skyspot Template radar is superimposed throughout South Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

In October 1965, the US Air Force realized that they still had an insufficient number of FACs. Although the Involvement Rule was changed to reduce the workload on FAC troops, USAF continues to be short of trained Forward Air Controllers until the withdrawal of US forces is reduced.

In April 1966, five Tactical Air Support Squadrons had filled the Air Force combat unit of the 504th Tactical Air Support Group. Squadron is based thus:

• The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron: Bien Hoa Air Base, Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
• 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron: Da Nang Air Base, RVN
• Tactical Air Support Squadron 21: Pleiku Airbase, RVN
• 22d Air Tactical Support Squadron: Binh Thuy Air Base, RVN
• 23d Air Tactical Support Squadron: Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Kingdom of Thailand

Group 504 is mostly served for logistics, maintenance and administration functions. It only consists of 250 O-1 Dog Dog FAC for all of South Vietnam. FAC should be given two battalions per maneuver. However, FAC is actually assigned to ground and live brigade forces and works with battalions on active operations. In September 1966, after the establishment of TASS 23d, the FAC effort was still short of 245 O-1 Bird Dogs, with no suitable alternatives.

From December 1965 onwards, close air support for the US Navy rivals in the Mekong Delta came from carrier flights. On January 3, 1969, the US Navy raised its own front air control squadron, Light Attack Squadron 4, using OV-10 Broncos borrowed from the Marine Corps. VAL-4 was deployed in Binh Thuy and Vung Tau, and would fly 21,000 combat troops before its dissolution on April 10, 1972. The assault would be a mixture of light strike missions and air-forward control.

The 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, under the control of the 3rd MARDIV operation at I Corps, is the only Army company officially permitted to direct air strikes. Since the Marine pilot of the VMO-6 was stretched by the intensity of combat operations in the DMZ, the pilot of 220 was, uniquely, awarded the Navy's Tactical Water Coordinator (Airborne) appointment. As an air handler, they are officially approved to carry out airstrikes in addition to directing artillery and Navy shots.

The Australian Air Force sends 36 FACs experienced and well-trained to serve in Vietnam, either attached to USAF units or with the No. 9 RAAF Squadron. One of them, Lieutenant Garry Cooper's Flight (see further reading section below), was presented with a difference as he was recommended to Medal of Honor by Major General Julian Ewell. The New Zealand Air Force put 15 of its FACs under US command during the war.

In 1968, there were 668 FAC Air Forces in the country, scattered in 70 locations of operations ahead across South Vietnam. In November, a minimum of 736 FACs was deemed necessary to direct the air war, but only 612 were available. USAF is seeking and reducing the requirement that all FACs become eligible fighter pilots at present, in an effort to supply demand. The level of FAC fishing from 1965 to 1968 averaged only about 70% of the projected needs. At this time, the cessation of the enemy's daytime activities in areas overseen by the FAC, when the communist turns into a night operation, will lead to a shift in night FAC operations by some O-2s. One hundred percent manning of the FAC requirements effort will eventually come in December 1969, through reduced demand for missions.

Mekong Delta and Cambodian invasion

After a preliminary trial against Ho Chi Minh Trail, Operation Shed Light A-1 Skyraiders equipped with low-level televisions were tested in night operations over the Mekong Delta. Flying at an altitude of 2,000 to 2,500 feet, A-1 found enemy targets at 83% of their sudden attacks, and launched attacks in about half of these sightings. The A-1 picked up more hits over the Delta than they had on the Trail, and the television did not work as well as expected. By the time the test was completed on December 1, 1968, the USAF had decided to develop further sensors. The cameras were stripped from the A-1 test, and the aircraft was forwarded to the 56th Special Operations Wing. However, low-light televisions will be further developed as part of a package of sensors mounted on the Canberra B-57 bomber.

Communists use Cambodia as a sanctuary for their troops, flanking South Vietnam's efforts and venturing across the border into the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam for operations and retreating into "neutral" territory to escape the counter-attack. On April 20, 1970, the Cambodian government asked the US to ask for help on the issue of border protection. On April 30, the US and South Vietnam sent ground troops to Cambodia to destroy communist supplies and shelters. They are supported by a major air campaign. Four Tactical Air Support Squadrons are committed to efforts - 19, 20, 22d, and 23d. To handle such a big effort, TACP is committed, delivering instructions to the FAC via a central air FAC dubbed "Head Beagle". When he proved unequal to handle the volume of incoming air support, Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star was assigned to the task in December 1970. Although US ground troops withdrew from Cambodia on July 1, the air ban campaign continued. A 19th TASS release, FAC "Rural" in French, still patrols to support Cambodian troops. FAC America will covertly support non-communist Cambodians by directing a massive US air strike until 15 August 1973.

FAC operation against North Vietnam

The US military considers the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the southern part of North Vietnam as an extension of the South Vietnamese battlefield. In 1966, the US used the FAC of the 20th TASS, Flying O-1 Bird Dogs and then O-2 Skymasters, to direct air strikes on the Route Pack 1 section of Rolling Thunder. Contained in Route 1 Package, Tally Ho picks up at the southern end of Route Package plus DMZ. In August 1966, communist anti-aircraft fire made the eastern part of Tally Ho too dangerous for the O-1. Because land flames make Tally Ho's mission even more dangerous for slow prop planes, the Marines pioneered Fast FACs in Vietnam, using two-seater F9F Panther jets in this area, as well as on deep targets on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Marine Fast FACs also adjust the naval shots when they are north of the DMZ. There is also a pioneering effort by FAC Fast "Misty".

The biggest effect of Rolling Thunder on the use of FAC is its destruction. President Johnson stopped the bombing of over 20 degrees northern longitude in North Vietnam on April 1, 1968. On November 1, 1968, he completely ended the bombing of North Vietnam, closing Operation Rolling Thunder. This termination will lead to a drastic diversion of US air power towards the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

FAC operation in Laos

The basis of military operations in Laos differs radically from Vietnam. Laotian neutrality was established by an international treaty of the 1954 Geneva Agreement that prohibits foreign military except small French military missions. In December 1961, General Phoumi Nosavan took over the Kingdom of Laos in the Battle of Vientiane. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supports its rise to power and establishes itself and their mercenaries as a key advocate of Laos armed forces. On May 29, 1961, because there would be no military advisory group in Laos, US President John F. Kennedy authorized the Ambassador to control all American paramilitary activities in the country. Thus it was that the CIA had taken responsibility for ground wars in Laos. They contracted the country's air supply mission to a civilian pilot from CIA airline Air America. The FAC US Air Force will be secretly imported by the ambassador to control the airstrikes under his supervision.

The initial use of forward air control in northern Laos was a sub-rosa effort by air and ground FAC during 19-29 July 1964 for the Operation Triangle. Enchanted by this experience, the USAF initially used the Combat Controller listed as a civilian, with the "Butterfly" call sign, to direct the air strike from a civilian aircraft flown by Air America. After General William Momyer canceled the "Butterfly" assignment, Raven's front air control unit was created on May 5, 1966 for Laos service as the successor to the Butterfly program. The US Air Force 404 project started an organized FAC effort at the request of Ambassador William H. Sullivan. Raven FAC is deployed throughout Laos. Two of their Air Operations Centers are located in northern Laos, in Luang Prabang and Long Tieng. Two more AOCs eyed on Ho Chi Minh Trail, in Pakxe and Savannakhet. The fifth AOC is in Vientiane.

Project 404 received FAC veteran at the Vietnam theater who volunteered for the Raven FAC task; they tend to be frustrated fighters with bureaucracy and the Byzantine Rules of Involvement. Just a few, flying in civilian clothes in unmarked O-1 Bird Dogs or U-17s, the Ravens often face tremendous tasks. In one instance, FAC flew 14 hours of combat in a single day. On the other hand, FAC directs 1,000 air strikes in 280 combat hours within a month. On certain occasions, lines up to six fighter bombers await the targets marked by Raven. In 1969, 60% of all tactical air attacks flown in Southeast Asia were issued in Laos. The Ravens range is greatly enlarged to deal with these tense air strikes, although they never exceed 22.

Working as FAC Raven is a very tiring, high-risk, and high-stress job. At the end of the war, there were 161 Butterflies and Ravens that directed air raids in Laos; 24 lost in action. The overall casualty rate ran about 50%. At the end of his journey, Raven Craig Duehring calculated that 90% of their aircraft had been hit by ground shells at some point, and 60% had fallen.

Nor is Ravens the only FAC working in Laos. By mid 1969, about 91 FAC packages per day were launched into Laos, about a third of them FAC jets.

FAC operations in northern Laos

The Raven FAC is deployed throughout Laos. Two of the Air Operations Centers (AOCs) are located in northern Laos, in Luang Prabang and Long Tieng. Two more AOCs eyed on Ho Chi Minh Trail, in Pakxe and Savannakhet. The fifth AOC is located in Vientiane. Simultaneously, beginning in March 1966, the TACAN unit began to be ruled in Laos.

Lima Site 85 is located in Phou Pha Thi, Laos, in Cordillera Annamese with beams leading to the nearest border in Hanoi. It will be flooded in March 1968.

Unlike other bombing campaigns in Southeast Asia, the Northern Laotian bombing campaign inside Barrel Roll will support guerrilla forces in action. The US Air Force and Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) tactical air strikes directed by advanced air controllers cleared the way for CIA-sponsored guerrillas ordered by General Vang Pao in their battle for the Guci Plain. Among these campaigns are Operation Pigfat, Operation Raindance, Off Balance Operation, and Face Operation. Joining the Ravens in this effort is FAK Quick "Tiger".

FAC operation against Ho Chi Minh Trail

In the beginning

The Ho Chi Minh Trail - Vietnamese name Tr? ng S? N trail - consists of road networks and transshipment points hidden by the forest. It will eventually evolve into an elaborate system of over 3,000 miles of highway links, footpaths, and truck gardens that flows on the eastern edge of the Vietnam/Laos border. Though located in Laos, material transmitted along the Trail supplies communist forces in South Vietnam. Related to that is another way through Dien Bien Phu to Xam Neua and further to northern Laos. The FAC surveillance patrol over Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos began in May 1964, even as the Trail network began a massive expansion. It became clear that the victory for the North Vietnam war effort depended on keeping the Path open. As mentioned above, the Tiger Steel operations ban campaign began April 3, 1965.

The communist gang against daytime air strikes is a shift to the movement of stock at night. O-1 Bird Dog initially attempted to FAC night operation to ban such shipments. Inadequate instrumentation and small target marker loads thus making it defective so other aircraft begin to be used in the role.

In July 1966, the A-26 Invaders used the call mark "Nimrod" to start a night operation against the Ho Chi Minh Trail with the support of multi-engine flareships. Although basically the aircraft strikes, it serves as FAC on occasion. Also in 1966, the US Air Force began experimenting with various night vision devices for FAC use, under the code name Operation Shed Light.

Emergence of sensor intelligence

The Starlight Scope became the key tool for FAC night operations. Initially tried to be installed in Skymaster 0-2. In late 1966, the scope was used for FAC along the Southern Ho Chi Minh Trail of C-130 Hercules flareships under the call mark "Blind Bat". The FAC works together with 0-2; after "Blind Bat" shines the area with a flare, 0-2 will mark the actual target. The strike aircraft are T-28 Trojans, A-1 Skyraiders, A-26 Invaders, or later in war - A-37 Dragonfly or F-4 Phantom. The C-123 provider of the 606th Special Operations Squadron, under the "Candlestick" call sign, fills the same role at the north end of the Trail. From September to December 1967, the prototype AC-130 tested various detection sensor capabilities to locate trucks. The newly installed Gunship enhances night vision capabilities, infrared detection units, radar arrays, and spotlights. The latter can be filtered to produce infrared or ultraviolet light, as well as ordinary light. The ignition detector will be added later, to indicate the engine is running from the supply truck.

Sensory testing was then incorporated into the White Igloo military intelligence system beginning in December 1967. At that time, FAC surveillance found five to ten times more trucks than before December; as many as 250 trucks were seen in a convoy, risking air strikes by using lights on. However, the Battle of Khe Sanh diverted the use of sensors from the Ho Chi Minh Trail to track communists besieging US Marines at an embattled fireside. This interruption undermines the full testing of "censorship of people"; as a result, the USAF prefers a tested sensor, which detects trucks. In January 1968, four A-1 Skyraiders were modified to carry two low-level television cameras assigned to Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Base. In February, they flew a test mission to the Steel Tiger to attack the trucks directly on the Trail. However, the exact test depends on flying at a straight level, while not exposed to ground fire. Ho Chi Minh Trail offers little chance for that. Sensory tests were transferred to South Vietnam.

War on trucks

On November 1, 1968, President Lyndon Baines Johnson declared stopping the bombing in North Vietnam, suspending the Rolling Thunder Operation. Immediately, with the North Vietnamese target off limits, the air power directed to Ho Chi Minh Trail nearly doubled, up from 140 to 620 sorties per day. Operation Commando Hunt will concentrate on destroying so many communist supply trucks so that the insurgency in the south will collapse due to lack of supply.

The communist anti-aircraft weapons, freed from defense duties by bombing, also moved south to the Strip. In late November 1968, US intelligence estimates there were 166 anti-aircraft weapons that defended the Line. Five months later, by the end of April 1969, 621 anti-aircraft weapons had been reported. Although no fire control radar is detected, the optically aimed weapon is still a strong force. Some 57mm weapons can reach the plane at an altitude of 12,500 feet. More than half of the weapons mounted along the Trail are 37mm cannons, which can reach heights of up to 8,200 feet. Double-mounted twin guns are mostly artillery pieces; they have a range of 5,000 feet. Underlying anti-aircraft artillery, a large number of machine guns were fired on low-level leaflets. Combining FAC's difficulties, the communists have more prepared places than antiaircraft guns, and can quickly move weapons from one site to another. They also set up artificial weapons feed sites. In mid-1969, the American pilot strike recorded an increase in the effectiveness of anti-aircraft defenses due to the influx of experienced shooters. At the end of 1969, the increasing danger of enemy anti-aircraft fire led to the withdrawal of "Candlesticks" from the Trail.

In the early 1970s, Paveway systems began to function; it requires the use of FAC from laser markers to guide what is called a "smart bomb". Different designers are installed on both Blindbats AC-130 and F-4 Phantom; both successfully used. In June 1970, the FAC era ended, because "Blindbats" was withdrawn. Martin B-57 Canberras of Operation Tropic Moon replaces them. However, the B-57 has limited its success with its high fuel consumption and sub-standard sensors. The fixed wing gun that works on the Trail becomes the main truck destroyer in Operation Commando Hunt. AC-119 will show marginal performance, and be too susceptible to ground fires to continue campaigning against trucks on Track. However, the AC-130 will be America's primary weapon against supply convoys.

Campaign results

Between November 1970 and May 1971, 12 AC-130 Specter from the Special Operations Squadron 16 (SOS) was credited with destroying 10,319 enemy trucks and damaging 2,733 others. When these spectacular results are added to other units blocking the Trail, it becomes clear that if the damage assessment is correct, North Vietnam runs out of usable trucks. Continuing the steady traffic on the Trail booed that assumption.

At that time, the 16th SOS had developed its own damage assessment criteria, given the visual observation of strike results was rare. According to the 16th:

• Exploding and/or burning vehicles are considered destroyed;
• Vehicles exposed to 40mm shells are considered destroyed;
• If the 40mm shell explodes within 10 feet of the vehicle, it is reportedly damaged;
• Vehicles exposed to 20mm fire are considered damaged.

According to Vietnam Magazine, on May 12, 1971, this criterion was tested by a demonstration of weapons staged by AC-130, directed against eight trucks targeted at a distance of bombing near Bien Hoa AB. By applying the criteria, the eight test targets will be reported five broken, three broken. In fact, ground checks proved that only two trucks were destroyed. Five more trucks can be operated after repair. One that will be reported destroyed under the criteria is still passable. Unexploded 20mm shells strewn on the ground, circling the truck. As a result of this test, the damage criterion was changed to report simply explode or burn the truck as destroyed.

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Notable Forward Air Controllers from Vietnam War

• Steven L. Bennett: Medal of Honor Recipient
• Hilliard A. Wilbanks: Medal of Honor Recipient
• Craig W. Duehring: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in subsequent years

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Legacy

By the time Igloo White ends, it costs more than two billion dollars in equipment costs, excluding lost aircraft costs. Operational costs doubled. Despite the costs, the Igloo White's emphasis on interdicting supply trucks instead of enemy forces failed to hinder the continuing communist attacks in South Vietnam.

The Vietnam War sees about 13 million tons of bombs dropped by the US and its allies. This is roughly six times the tonnage fell during World War II. However, unlike World War II, there was no mass arsenal of mass destruction in cities full of civilians. Instead, in the air support - and in many situations the prohibition - advanced air controllers are charged with the following Strict Involvement Rules in directing air strikes.

Source of the article : Wikipedia