The Great Chinese Famine (Chinese: ????? ) is the period in the People's Republic of China between 1959 and 1961 marked by famine expanding. Drought and severe weather contribute to hunger, although the relative weight of the contribution is debatable. Estimated deaths due to the famine ranges in the tens of millions.
Video Great Chinese Famine
Terminology
Hunger in China has been known by many names, inside China, and out.
In China, this is known as "Three Years of Great Chinese Famine" (Simplified Chinese: ????? ; Traditional Chinese: ????? ; pinyin: S? nniÃÆ'¡n dÃÆ' j? Hu? ng ). The Government of the People's Republic of China called it "Three Years of Natural Disasters" (Simplified Chinese: ?????? ; Traditional Chinese: ? ????? ; pinyin: i S? nniÃÆ'¡n zÃÆ'¬rÃÆ'¡nz? ihÃÆ' i ) before the 1980s, and then renamed it "Three Years of Difficulty" (Simplified Chinese: ?????? ; Traditional Chinese: ?????? ; pinyin: S? nniÃÆ'¡n kÃÆ'¹nnÃÆ'¡n shÃÆ'q? ) or " A Long Leap Forward of Hunger. "
Maps Great Chinese Famine
Origins
The great Chinese famine is caused by a combination of adverse weather conditions, social pressures, economic mismanagement, and radical changes in agriculture imposed by government regulations.
Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, introduced a drastic change in agricultural policy that prohibits the ownership of agricultural land. Failure to comply with policies leads to punishment. Social pressure imposed on citizens in agriculture and business, controlled by the government, causes state instability. Due to laws passed during the period and the Great Leap Forward during 1958-1962, according to an analysis by journalist Yang Jisheng, about 36 million people died of starvation during this period.
Until the early 1980s, the Chinese government's attitude, reflected in the name "Three Years of Natural Disasters", was that famine was largely the result of a series of natural disasters that were exacerbated by some planning mistakes. Researchers outside China argue that the large-scale institutional and policy changes that accompany the Great Leap Forward are key factors in hunger, or at least worsening natural disasters. Since the 1980s, there has been greater official Chinese recognition of the importance of policy mistakes in causing disasters, claiming that disasters are 30% due to natural causes and 70% by mismanagement.
During the Great Leap Forward, agriculture is organized into communes and cultivation of forbidden private plots. Iron and steel production is identified as a key requirement for economic progress. Millions of farmers were ordered to leave the agricultural work to join the iron and steel production workforce.
Yang Jisheng will summarize the effect of focus on production targets in 2008:
In Xinyang, people were starving at the door of the grain shed. When they died, they shouted, "Communist Party, Chairman Mao, save us". If the Henan and Hebei barns are opened, no one needs to die. When people are dying in large numbers around them, officials do not think to save them. Their only concern is how to meet the delivery of grain.
Along with collectivization, the central government decided some changes in agricultural techniques based on the ideas of Soviet pseudoscientist Trofim Lysenko. One of these ideas is a close cultivation, in which the seed density initially tripled and then doubled again. The theory is that plants of the same species will not compete with each other. In practice they do so, whose growth is inhibited and produces lower yields.
Another policy (known as "internal piracy") is based on the ideas of Lysenko's colleague Terentiy Maltsev, who encourages farmers across China to keep the normal 15-20 centimeter depth of piracy rather than plowing deeply into the ground (1 to 2 meters). The deep plow theory asserts that the most fertile soil is deep in the earth, and deep plowing will allow for stronger root growth. However, in shallow soil, useless stones, soil, and sand are moved on the contrary, burying fertile topsoil and stunting seedling growth.
In addition, in the Great Swallow campaign, residents are asked to destroy sparrows and other wild birds that feed on plant seeds, to protect the fields. Bird pests are shot down or scared from landing to fall due to fatigue. This results in an explosion of pest populations (especially plant-eating insects), which have no predators to lower them.
Malicious radical changes in agricultural organizations coincide with bad weather patterns, including droughts and floods. In July 1959, the Yellow River flooded East China. According to the Disaster Center, direct floods were killed, either because of famine due to crop failure or drowning, an estimated 2 million people, while other areas were also affected in other ways. Frank DikÃÆ'¶tter argues that most floods are not due to unusual weather, but to large irrigation works, poorly planned and poorly executed that are part of the Great Leap Forward.
In 1960, about 60% of farmland in northern China received no rain at all. The EncyclopÃÆ'Â|dia Britannica yearbooks from 1958 to 1962 also reported abnormal weather, followed by droughts and floods based on Chinese government sources. This included 760 millimeters (30 Â ° in) rain in Hong Kong for five days in June 1959, part of a pattern that swept across South China.
As a result of these factors, year-on-year grain production declined in China. The harvest fell by 15% in 1959. In 1960, it reached 70% of the 1958 level. There was no recovery until 1962, after the Great Leap Forward ended. According to China Statistical Yearbook (1984), crop production declined from 200 million tons in 1958 to 143.5 million tons in 1960.
Superabundance Illusion
The party began exporting excessive grain from the area in 1957 under the Great Leap Forward. However, grain production throughout China declined from 1957-1961. In areas, such as Sichuan Province, the collected grains declined from 1958-1961, but the reported numbers continue to increase. Beijing believes, "in 1960 the granary of the country would have 50 billion jin grains" when in fact it contained 12.7 billion jin. In Da Fo "food output > is generally not decreased, but there is an extraordinary loss of food availability related to Maoist country grabs â €" and seed yield Gansu's grant decreased 4.273 billion kilos from 1957 to 1961. A series of these events resulted in the illusion of superabundance, in which the Party believed that they had excess grain they could access, but the Party was also unaware that the yield was lower than the average.
The superabundance effect of illusion is so significant, making historians refute it as the cause of many hunger across China. Yang Dali states that there are three major consequences of the superabundance illusion:
First, it caused planners to shift land from wheat to economic crops, such as cotton, sugarcane, and beets, and diverting large numbers of agricultural laborers into the industrial sector, pushing the country's demand for grain from the countryside. Second, it encourages China's leadership, especially Zhou Enlai, to accelerate grain exports to secure more foreign currency to pay debts to the Soviet Union and to purchase the capital goods needed for industrialization. Finally, the illusion of superabundance made the adoption of the commune hall feel rational by then. All of these changes, of course, contribute to the rapidly depleting supply of grain.
Government distribution and policies
The topic of the People's commune and the degree to which it affects hunger holds disputes in terms of its effects. Each region deals with hunger differently and the timeline of hunger is not uniform across China. The overarching argument is that overeating occurring in the mess rooms directly leads to worsening of hunger and that if overeating does not occur later, "the worst of the Great Hunger Leap is inevitable in mid 1959." However, horrible famine is not regulated into Da Fo until 1960 and the participation level of the public dining room was found to be meaningless in terms of causes in Anhui and Jianxi.
The government policies implemented, especially the Three Red Banners and the Socialist Education Movement (SEM), prove to be ideologically detrimental to rising hunger. The CCP's Two Red Banners "sparked fanaticism in 1958" and the implementation of the General Line, one of three banners that told people to "work hard, achieve goals, and build socialism better, better and more. economic outcomes "are directly related to the pressure felt by officials when reporting an abundance of grain. SEM, founded in 1957, also caused the severity of hunger in many ways, including the illusion of superabundance. After the enlargement of the harvest from the General Line was reported, "no one dared to 'wet cold water'" on further reports. SEM also leads to the formation of conspiracy ideas where farmers are believed to be hungry to sabotage state grain purchases.
Power relations in local government
Local governments have as much, if not more, influence against hunger than agriculture and higher forms of government. As the Great Leap Forward flourished, many provincial leaders began to expand their reach by working closely with Mao and the leaders of the higher Party; which, in turn, resulted in the leaders of this province abusing the power they did not have. This abuse of power causes passivity at the local level. Local landlords began to "denounce any opposition as a" right conservative, "" which is broadly defined as anti-communist. With the ongoing conspiracy theories revolving around farmers, it appears that saving more grains for family meals, the belief that the Great Leap Forward should not be implemented, or simply not working hard enough can all be seen as a 'right conservative' form. 'This hatred causes farmers to be unable to openly talk about the collectivization and purchase of state rice. By establishing such passivity at the local level while there is already official passivity, speaking and acting against hunger is an impossible task.
The influence of local government in famine can be seen in comparison between Anhui and Jiangxi provinces. Anhui, who had a radical pro-Mao government, was led by Zeng Xisheng's "dictator" with ties to Mao. Zeng strongly believes in the Great Leap Forward and tries to establish relationships with higher officials rather than maintaining close local relationships. Zeng proposed agricultural projects without consulting with colleagues who caused the Anhui farm to fail badly. Zhang Kaifan, a party secretary and deputy provincial governor, hears rumors of famine that broke out in Anhui and disagrees with many of Zeng's policies. Zeng reported Ms. Zhang to Mao for such speculations which caused Mao to label Zhang "a member of the 'Peng Dehui Peng anti-Party military clique'," which resulted in him being removed from a local party. Zeng could not report hunger when it became an emergency because it would prove his hypocrisy and cause him to be "a blatantly radical politics that almost alone ruined Anhui."
Jiangxi faces an almost opposite situation than the situation in Anhui. Jiangxi leaders openly opposed several Big Leap programs, quietly making themselves unavailable, and even seeming to take a passive attitude toward the Maoist economy. When leaders work together among themselves, they also work with the local population. By being able to create an environment in which the Great Leap Forward is not fully implemented, the Jiangxi government "does its best to minimize damage..." These findings lead to the conclusion that much of the severity of hunger comes to provincial leaders and their responsibilities for their region.
Extent
Due to the lack of food and incentives to marry at the time, the population was around 658,590,000 in 1961, about 13,480,000 fewer than the population in 1959. The birth rate decreased from 2,922% (1958) to 2.086% (1960) and increased mortality rates from 1,198% (1958) to 2,543% (1960), while the average number for 1962-1965 was about 4% and 1%, respectively.
According to government statistics, there were 15 million excess deaths in this period. Unofficial estimates vary, but experts estimate the number of famine victims between 20 and 43 million. The officially reported mortality figures show a much more dramatic increase in some provinces and districts. In Sichuan province, the most populous province in China, for example, the government reported 11 million deaths from a total population of around 700 million during 1958-1961. In Huaibin County, Henan province, the government reported 102 thousand deaths from a population of 378 thousand in 1960. At the national level, official statistics imply about 15 million so-called "excessive deaths" or "abnormal deaths", most of them resulting from starvation.
Yu Dehong, secretary of a party official in Xinyang in 1959 and 1960, stated,
I went to one village and saw 100 bodies, then another village and 100 more corpses. No one noticed them. People say that dogs eat the body. Not true, I say. The dogs have long been eaten by people.
It is widely believed that the government actually reported the number of unreported deaths: Lu Baoguo, a Xinhua reporter at Xinyang, told Yang Jisheng about why he never reported his experience:
In the second half of 1959, I took a long-distance bus from Xinyang to Luoshan and Gushi. Outside the window, I saw one corpse after another in the gutter. In the bus, no one dared to mention the dead. In one area, Guangshan, one-third of the people have died. Although there are people dying everywhere, local leaders enjoy good food and liquor.... I have seen people who say the truth is destroyed. Do I dare write it?
Some Western analysts, such as Patricia Buckley Ebrey, estimate that about 20-40 million people have died of starvation caused by bad government policies and natural disasters. J. Banister estimates that this amount is about 23 million. Li Chengrui, former minister of China's National Bureau of Statistics, estimates 22 million (1998). Estimates are based on Ansley J. Coale and Jiang Zhenghua estimates of 27 million. Cao Shuji estimates 32.5 million. Yang Jisheng (2008) estimated the death toll reached 36 million.
The Hong Kong-based historian Frank DikÃÆ'¶tter (2010) estimates that at least 45 million people died from starvation, forced labor and state violence during the Great Leap, claiming his findings were based on access to the archives of newly opened local and provincial parties. His study also emphasized that state violence exacerbates the number of fatalities. DikÃÆ'¶tter claims that at least 2.5 million victims were beaten or tortured to death. His approach to the document, as well as his claim as the first author to use it, however, has been questioned by other scholars.
Chinese journalist Yang Jisheng concluded there were 36 million deaths due to hunger, while another 40 million failed to be born, so "The total Chinese population lost during the Great Famine then came to 76 million."
DikÃÆ'¶tter provides a graphic example of what happened to the family after one member was caught stealing some food:
Liu Desheng, guilty of hunting for sweet potatoes, covered with urine... He, his wife, and his son were also forced into a pile of filth. Then the tongs used to open his mouth after he refused to swallow the dirt. He died three weeks later.
There are widespread oral reports, and some official documentation, of cannibalism practiced in various forms, as a result of hunger. Because of the scale of famine, the resulting cannibalism has been described as "on an unprecedented scale in 20th century history".
The term "Three Years of Bitter" is often used by Chinese peasants to refer to this period.
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Local party leaders, for their part, conspire to cover up deficiencies and redefine mistakes to protect their own lives and positions.
During a visit to Henan province in 1958, Mao observed what local officials claimed was an increase of the thousand to three thousand percent crop achieved, supposedly, in a massive 24-hour push organized by officials they called "sputnik launches ". But the amount was forged, and so were the fields that Mao had observed, carefully prepared before Mao's visit by the local authorities, who removed the wheat buds from various fields and carefully transferred them to fields specially prepared for Mao, which seems to be a bumper plant.
Local officials were caught by this false demonstration to Mao, and urged farmers to achieve an unattainable goal, by "deep planting and planting closely," and other techniques. This eventually worsened the situation, the harvest failed miserably, leaving a barren field. No one was in a position to challenge Mao's ideas as wrong, so the peasants pulled their blankets and coats into the fields, added seeds and water, and after they sprouted, buried underground materials once the seeds were high enough.
In the same way as the great hunger created by the Soviets in Ukraine (Holodomor), doctors are prohibited from registering "starvation" as the cause of death on death certificates. Such a hoax is far from common; a famous propaganda image of famine shows Chinese children from Shandong province pretending to stand on wheat fields, thereby growing solid so it seems to be able to support their weight. In fact, they stand on benches hidden beneath the plants, and the "fields" are entirely composed of individual transplanted rods. A propaganda photo symbolized.
Amartya Sen puts this famine in a global context, arguing that the lack of democracy is the main cause: "Indeed, no major famine ever takes place in a democratic country - no matter how poor it is." He added that "it is difficult to imagine that such a thing can happen in a country that goes to polling stations regularly and that has an independent press." During that horrible disaster the government did not face the pressure of the newspaper, which was controlled, and none of the opposition party, which is absent. "
On the other hand, Sen shows that in India the "excess mortality" rate regularly exceeds from China during 1958-1961.
![Great chinese famine [1959-1961] : jerma985](https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/blogger_img_proxy/AEn0k_tEUD2BUuG6X62i2SeWwzWkDBAGrtWzl4fTapOyGfF701NEQXWgJcTx_UHy_5UG5WI8oo1u1j1Uhsn9ThVwSaJ0u_n7SYbWKncB2d6ElPsnco5jtucHhYJgEJdZMfHMG1xEal4MWT2rNA=s0-d "Great chinese famine [1959-1961] : jerma985")
See also
- Hunger of Northern China in 1876-79
- Chinese Famine 1928-30
- Chinese Famine 1942-43
- Four Pest Campaigns
- Holodomor
- Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Destructive Disaster, 1958-62
- 70,000 Characters Characters
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