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Arrow or Hetz (Hebrew: ??? ?, pronounced Homa " (Hebrew: ? ??? ?, pronounced [? oma] , "rampart") administration and Missile Defense Agency US.

The Arrow system consists of the combined production of anti-missile anti-missile Arrow, Early Warning Elesa EL/M-2080 "Green Pine" AESA radar, Elisra "Golden Citron" ("Citron Tree") C 3 center, and Israel Aerospace Industries "Brown Hazelnut" ("Hazelnut Tree") launches a control center. This system can be moved, as it can be moved to another prepared site.

After the development and testing of the technology demonstrator Arrow 1, production and deployment began with a 2nd arrow version of the missile. Arrow is considered one of the most advanced missile defense programs available today. This is the first operational missile defense system specifically designed and built to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles. The first Arrow battery was declared fully operational in October 2000. Although some of its components have been exported, Israel's Israeli Air Force Defense Command (IAF) from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is currently the only complete user. Arrow system.

The upper armored upper space of the Israeli missile defense, Arrow 3, is declared operational on January 18, 2017. Arrow 3 operates at greater speed, greater range and at greater altitudes than Arrow 2, intercept ballistic missiles during the flight-space section of their tracks. According to the head of the Israeli Space Agency, Arrow 3 can serve as an anti-satellite weapon, which will make Israel one of the few countries in the world capable of shooting down satellites.


Video Arrow (Israeli missile)



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The Arrow program was launched in order to acquire by Arab states of surface-to-surface long-range missiles. It was chosen over the ABFA AB-10 ABA missile defense system because Arrow is considered to be a more complete concept and has greater range. The AB-10 system was criticized as a mere increase in MIM-23 Hawk, rather than a system designed from scratch for missile interception.

The United States and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding to fund the Arrow program on May 6, 1986, and in 1988 the Strategic Defense Strategic Defense Organization of the United States (SDIO) placed an order with Israel Aircraft Industries for Arrow 1 technology demonstrators. The Gulf War, which exposes Patriot's controversial missile performance against Iraq's "Al Hussein" missile, gives further impetus to Arrow's development. Originally designed to intercept missiles such as the SS-1 "Scud", derivatives of "Al Hussein", SS-21 "Scarab" operated by Syria, and CSS-2 operated by Saudi Arabia. Arrow also evolved by overseeing Iran's advanced missile program. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli Defense Minister, saw the threat of a missile emerging as one of the most dangerous future threats to Israel's security. He said about the program:

The Israeli Administration for Arms Development and Infrastructure Technology, part of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, runs the Arrow development project under "Homa" administration. The "Homa" administration, which is also commonly referred to as IMDO - the Israel Missile Defense Organization, is responsible for coordinating the activities of different Israeli defense industry industries involved in the development of the Arrow system.

Funding

The multibillion-dollar Arrow development program is underway in Israel with US financial support. When development programs begin, projections for the total cost of development and manufacture - including the initial production of missiles - are estimated at $ 1.6 billion. The price of one Arrow missile is estimated at $ 3 million. Between 1989 and 2007 about $ 2.4 billion has been reportedly invested in the Arrow program, 50-80 percent funded by the United States. Israel contributes about $ 65 million per year.

Criticism and disagreement

The Arrow program faces opposition from the IAF, whose traditional doctrine on the prevention and use of preemptive attacks is in stark contrast to the nature of the missiles. In addition, the IAF is concerned that costly missile procurement will reduce the resources allocated to offensive projects such as fighter aircraft.

A criticism of the concept of missile defense for Israel was broadcast by Dr. Reuven Pedatzur in a comprehensive study published in 1993 by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. The arguments made in this study fit the opinions of many defense officials and analysts, and echo many of the arguments made by critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative in the United States.

Pedatzur argues that it's very simple to trick an Arrow-type defense system with simple, inexpensive, and easy-to-install counter measures that will make the Arrow system ineffective. He doubted the Israeli defense industry could rise to the challenges of such a complex system, citing anonymous experts at the IDF who predicted that the system would not be available before 2010. He envisioned enormous costs, around $ 10 billion, which would distort budget priorities and divert funding from the crucial increase in IDF's fighting power capability, thereby forcing a deep revision of Israel's national security doctrine. He further stated that even if effectively against missiles with conventional, chemical or biological warheads, Arrows would not be relevant to future threats of missiles with nuclear warheads, as it would never be able to supply hermetic defenses and impact even a single nuclear warhead in the area the densely populated urban Israel will become an existential threat to Israel.

At the same time, John E. Pike, who worked later with the Federation of American Scientists, stated that "the technical problems provided with radar systems and command systems, coupled with the high development costs, Arrow program will soon fall by the wayside." Victoria Samson, a research fellow from the Defense Information Center, also stated in October 2002 that the Arrow system can not track incoming missiles that have broken the warhead into submunitions.

In June 2003 a group of Israeli chief engineers, co-inventors, and IAI project managers and subcontractors were awarded the Israeli Defense Prize for the development and production of the Arrow system.

According to Dr. Uzi Rubin, IMDO's first Director, with the passage of time, most pessimistic predictions have proved unfounded. The Israeli defense industry overcame technical challenges, system development completed a full decade before what was predicted, and there is no indication that expenditure for Arrow harms any other IDF procurement plan for any level. Rubin asserted that Israel's missile defense is now an established fact and that most of the warnings issued by critics have failed to materialize. Pedatzur, however, remained unsure.

Maps Arrow (Israeli missile)



Development

Arrow 1

The first launch of the Arrow intercept took place on 9th of August 1990, designed to test the control and missile control systems. The test stopped a few seconds after takeoff and the missile was deliberately destroyed because of fears it might get off track and hit a predetermined location. This is due to the failure of ground tracking radar to track the missile trajectory. Test number two took place on March 25, 1991. Designed to examine missile components at launch, it was done from a ship at sea. Again missile malfunctions result in trial abortions. The third test, designed to test Arrow's interception capability, was carried out on October 31, 1991. The missile was once again launched from a ship at sea, and was once again canceled due to a repetition of previous malfunctions.

On September 23, 1992, in testing other missile components during launch, the system eventually operated as planned and Arrow reached a point specified in the sky, 45 seconds after launch. As planned, the missile was then destroyed. This successful experiment ended the initial system testing phase. The fifth, sixth, and seventh tests were conducted on February 28, July 14, and October 14, 1993. During this time, Panah successfully pass near the missile target, thus proving its ability to intercept surface-to-surface missiles. During test number eight on March 1, 1994, the missile was not launched due to a computer failure on land. The launch of the ninth test on June 12, 1994, also known as ATD # 1 (Arrow Demonstration Test 1), saw Arrow 1 successfully intercept a target missile launched from a ship docked in the middle of the Mediterranean.

Arrow 1 is reported as a two-stage propellant missile, with an overall length of 7.5 m (25 feet), a body diameter of 1,200 mm (47 inches), and a launch weight of about 2,000 kg (4,400 lb). It is estimated that the second stage has a length of 2.5 m (8.2 m), and it has an inertial mid-course guidance and update command, with terminal terminal terminal infrared terminals. The missile was described as a relatively high speed and maneuverable, with a thrust vector in both stages. The range capability has been described as about 50 km (31 mi). On the other hand, Arrow 1 can be a one-stage missile. The "big and complicated" development of Arrow 1 then stopped and further research continued with "Smaller arrows, faster and more deadly" 2.

Arrow 2

Two successful tests (designated IIT # 21 and IIT # 22) from steering, control and roaming systems were conducted without target missiles on July 30, 1995 and February 20, 1996. Two successful interceptions occurred on August 20, 1996 and March 11, 1997, and AIT # 21 and AIT # 22. Another interception test (AIT # 23) was performed on August 20, 1997, but the missile was destroyed when the steering system did not work. The error was corrected in time to ensure the success of AST # 3, the first comprehensive test of the entire system. On September 14, 1998, all system components successfully responded to the threat of computer simulation. On November 29, 1998, Israel Aerospace Industries sent its first operational Arrow 2 interceptor to the Israeli Defense Ministry.

The complete system interception test (AST # 4) was conducted on November 1, 1999. During this test, the Arrow system locates, tracks and intercepts the TM-91C target missile simulating the "Scud" missile, launched on a very steep track of vessels located at offshore. The TM-91C's own missile target is based on the Arrow 1 interceptor 1. On March 14, 2000, the first complete Arrow 2 battery was launched in a ceremony at Palmachim Airbase. In his speech, then IAF commander Aluf Eitan Ben Eliyahu said:

Another Arrow 2 test (AST # 5) took place on 14 September 2000, this time with a new target missile, Rafael Advanced Defense System "Black Sparrow". This air-ballistic missile missile, launched by IAF F-15 to the Israeli coastline on a ballistic track that simulates a "Scud" aggressor, is intercepted and destroyed. As a result, the following month saw the Palmachim Arrow battery operated by the Israeli Air Defense Command. The "Black Sparrow" has since been used as an aggressor target in AST # 6, AST # 9, and AST # 10 tests. Reportedly, in June 2001, arrow missiles were tested in a series of joint Israeli-American-Israeli exercise codes called Anatolian Eagle, in southeastern Turkey. On August 27, 2001 (AST # 6), the Arrow system successfully intercepted its target at some 100 km (62 mi) from the beach, the highest and farthest that has been tested by Arrow 2 to date. In October 2002, the second battery was declared operational.

Block-2

The successful test of Arrow 2 blocks-2 took place on 5 January 2003 (AST # 8). Four missiles are launched toward the four simulation targets to check the intercept performance during special flight conditions and system performance during launch sequences. This test does not include actual interceptions. Another successful test was held on December 16, 2003 (AST # 9), examining the ability of the system to intercept and destroy incoming missiles at very high altitudes, about 60 km (37 mi). Reportedly, AST # 8 and AST # 9 also tested the integration of Arrow with Patriot battery.

On July 29, 2004, Israel and the United States conducted a joint test at the Naval Naval Station Missile Test Center (NAS Point Mugu) in California, where Arrow interceptors were launched against real "Scud-B" missiles.. This test represents a realistic scenario that can not be tested in Israel due to security restrictions on field testing. To activate the test, the full battery is sent to Point Mugu. Green Pine radar and command-and-control systems are deployed at the base, while the Arrow launcher is installed 100 km (62 mi) offshore on an island that is part of the test range. The test was a success, with interceptors destroying the "Scud" that flew a 300 km (190 miles) trajectory at an altitude of 40 km (25 miles), west of San Nicolas Island. This is the twelfth Arrow intercept test and the seventh test of the complete system, the first interception of the real "Scud". This significant test is known as AST USFT # 1. After this test, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz says:

AST USFT # 2 was done at NAS Point Mugu a month later, on August 26th. This test aims to test the ability of Arrow to detect separate warheads from separate ballistic missiles. It detects the actual target, but technical damage is reported to prevent it from maneuvering to attack it, leading to suspension of testing. In March-April 2005 the capabilities of "Green Pine" and "Golden Citron" to work with elements of the Patriot system operated by the US Army have been successfully tested against a "Scud" -type simulation target during the bi-annual series of US-Israeli exercises named code "Juniper Cobra". The actual testing of the complete Arrow system continued in December 2005, when the system successfully intercepted targets at reported low altitudes but reported. This test (AST # 10) is the fourteenth test of the Arrow missile and the ninth test of the complete system.

Block-3

On February 11, 2007, Arrow 2 block-3 successfully intercepted and destroyed the target missile "Black Sparrow" which simulates ballistic missiles at high altitudes. This is the first distributed weapons system test conducted in Israel, requiring two Arrow units to spread around 100 km (62 mi) apart to share data on incoming threats and coordinate the launch assignment. It was also the first time the Link 16 data distribution system was used to connect two Arrow units, although the system had been used in previous tests to connect Arrow and Patriot batteries. Next, the improved launcher is used. Another "Juniper Cobra" exercise ran from March 10 to 20, 2007. The computer simulation used for "Juniper Cobra 2007" is similar to a computer simulation used in "Juniper Cobra 2005".

The next block precursor was launched without a target on March 26, 2007 to collect information about aviation and performance, introducing unspecified modifications to hardware and electronics and reducing production costs by about 20 percent. Arieh Herzog, then Director of IMDO, said: "Our Arrow operational system is without a doubt able to deal with all operational threats in the Middle East, especially in Iran and Syria."

Block-4

On April 15, 2008, the Arrow arms system successfully detected and simulated interception of a new target missile, "Blue Sparrow", the successor of "Black Sparrow" capable of simulating missiles "Scud-C/D" and reported Shahab-3 Iran as well. During the test, the target missile was launched from IAF F-15 at an altitude of 90,000 feet (27.5 km). The missile split into several warheads, making it harder to intercept it. However, "Green Pine" tracks the warhead, simulating an interception. In September 2008 the IDF tried an Arrow 2 block-4 missile test against "Blue Sparrow". However, the drill must be canceled, when the target missile does not work after launch. Finally Arrow 2 blocks-4 successfully tested against "Blue Sparrow" on April 7, 2009.

On July 22, 2009, a combined test of Arrow 2 blocks 4 against airborne missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km (620 miles) once again at NAS Point Mugu, was reportedly canceled at the last second before launch after missiles failed to establish communications links. A target has been removed from the C-17 Globemaster III aircraft, the radar detects the target and moves its tracks, but the interceptors are not launched. "Target tracking works well, but tracking track information that the radar transferred to the combat management center mistakenly indicated we would be out of the specified security range, so the mission was canceled," the program source said. The aborted abandonment comes after two previous setbacks in the planned test, originally scheduled for July 17th. The first trial was postponed due to a technical error in the C-17 aircraft, and the planned July 20 attempt was scrubbed because the defective electric battery did not provide enough power for the key elements of the Arrow system. This test is widely referred to as a failure, but interoperability objectives with other ballistic missile defense systems are achieved.

On February 22, 2011, the Arrow system successfully intercepted long range ballistic missile missiles during flight tests conducted at NAS Point Mugu. The target missile is launched from the mobile launch platform off the coast of California, within the Mugu Point range. This test validates a new 4-block version designed to increase the discriminatory ability of the Arrow 2 interceptor. It is a body-to-body impact that completely destroys the target.

On February 10, 2012, the developer successfully conducted the final target tracking test before the delivery of Arrow-4 Arrow system. Blue Sparrow's target missiles are detected and tracked by radar, an intercepted solution plotted by combat management controllers and transferred to the launch unit.

According to Arieh Herzog, the 4-block upgrade "enhances the discrimination process of what happens in the sky and the transmission of target data for much better situational control." Renewal of block-4 also enhances midcourse guidance which, when combined with increased target identification and discrimination ability, increases mortality rates.

Block-4.1 is expected to include a new Battle Management Center, armored launchers with high shooting availability, better communications with other missile systems and wider intercept range. On September 9, 2014, interception tests were conducted in the Mediterranean Sea with a 4.1-block version of the operational system. The results can not be inferred and remain so until the data is fully analyzed. In February 2015, an official at IMDO acknowledged that the test was obtained, but failed to achieve its target. The real reason behind the failure was not granted, but officials initially linked the error to software problems that could easily be fixed.

Block-5

In April 2011 IMDO launched the initial definition of a new 5-block upgrade to a complete Arrow system that would combine the low-level Arrow 2 and Exoatmospheric Arrow 3 into a single national missile defense system. According to Arieh Herzog, the planned 5-block will include new ground and air sensors, command and control systems, and a new targeted missile - Silver Sparrow - to simulate a nuclear-powered delivery vehicle developed by Iran. According to the US Missile Defense Agency, block-5 is expected to address "more pressing regional threats" by increasing the total area maintained by about 50 percent.

The planned 5-block will optimize existing Super Green Pine radar to operate with AN/TPY-2 radar as well as radar-guided anti-ballistic missiles on US Navy destroyers. US radars will be used to support closed-loop operations if Israeli and US targets in the region are attacked.

Arrow 3

In August 2008 the United States and the Israeli government initiated the development of a top-level component to the Israeli Air Defense Command, known as Arrow 3. This development was based on a study of architectural definitions undertaken in 2006-2007, which determined the need for high-level components to be integrated into in Israel's ballistic missile defense system. According to Arieh Herzog, the main element of this upper tier will be an exoatmospheric interceptor, to be developed jointly by IAI and Boeing. Arrow 3 is declared to operate on January 18, 2017.

Arrow 3 operates at greater speed, greater range and at greater altitudes than Arrow 2, intercept ballistic missiles during the space flight portion of their trajectory. According to the head of the Israeli Space Agency, Arrow 3 can serve as an anti-satellite weapon, which will make Israel one of the few countries in the world capable of shooting down satellites.

Arrow 4

The Israeli Ministry of Defense and industry developers have begun work early on what could have evolved into Arrow 4, a new missile interceptor system to defend itself from the far more sophisticated future threats. Boaz Levy, executive vice president of IAI, said it may be premature to refer to Arrow 4 efforts. However, he acknowledges that an ongoing design study is aimed at future interceptors that will expand abilities beyond Arrow 2 and Arrow 3.

Israel postpones Alaska test of Arrow 3 missile interceptor | The ...
src: static.timesofisrael.com


Specifications

The Arrow system was originally designed and optimized to intercept short and medium range ballistic missiles with a range above 200 km (120 mi). It is not intended to intercept either military aircraft or artillery rockets, the second relatively small and short-range. In contrast to THAAD, RIM-161 Standard Missile 3, and MIM-104 Patriot PAC-3, which uses kinetic, the direct hit-to-kill impact of Arrow 2 relies on explosive explosions. Arrow 2 is able to intercept its target over the stratosphere, high enough that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons do not spread throughout Israel. The purpose of the developer is to do the sequence of destruction away from the location of the population. According to Dr. Uzi Rubin, the missile was tested to determine whether chemical war agents would reach the ground if the warhead was tapped. The conclusion is that no one will reach the ground if the warhead is destroyed above the jet stream, which flows from west to east and therefore will blow the chemical residue. Nevertheless, Arrow is also capable of low-altitude interception, as well as the interception of multi-tactical ballistic missiles.

Two-stage missiles are equipped with solid propellant boosters and motor support rockets. Missiles use initial combustion to conduct vertical heat launch from containers and secondary burns to maintain the missile path to target at Mach 9 speeds, or 2.5 km/sec (1.6 mi/sec). Thrust vector control is used in the upgrading and flight support phases. At the ignition of the second stage driving motor, the first-stage assembly separates. Arrow missiles are launched before the track and interruption points of missile threat are accurately known. The more available trajectory data, the optimum intercept point is defined more precisely, in that direction the missile is then guided. Parts of the vehicle kill 500Ã,¬k (1,100 pounds) of missiles, containing warheads, smelter and terminal seekers, equipped with four moving aerodynamic control deltas that move to provide low-altitude interception capabilities. The dual mode missile seekers have passive infrared scouts for the acquisition and tracking of tactical ballistic missiles and active radar seekers are used to return home on air-breathing targets at low altitudes. The infrared locator is an array of focal plots of indium antimonide. The killer vehicle is designed to achieve a hit-to-kill interception, but if this is not achieved, the proximity fuze will direct the warhead fragment to the target just before reaching the closest point to the target. The explosion of a high explosive warhead is capable of destroying the target within a 40-50 m (130-160 ft) radius. In this way, Arrow also differs from Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, and Standard Missile 3, which completely relies on hit-to-kill technology in which the kinetic power of the right impact causes a destruction of threats.

According to Dov Raviv, a senior developer dubbed "the father of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile", a single Arrow interceptor has a 90 percent chance of destroying the target missile at the highest possible elevation. In case of failure, two more interceptors can be launched toward the target at short intervals. If the first one destroys the target, the second can be directed to another target. Using this technique, three possible independent interceptors are provided that increase the probability of interception from 90 percent to 99.9 percent, thus meeting leakage rate requirements. Arrow also has the ability to simultaneously intercept the salvo of more than five incoming missiles, with missile targets arriving within 30 seconds. Such capabilities are currently owned only by the United States and Russia. According to Raviv, Arrows can distinguish between warheads and baits.

Each Arrow battery is equipped with four to eight launchers, which require about 100 personnel. Each trailer-mounted launcher weighs 35 tons (77,000 pounds) when loaded with six launch-tubes with a fire-ready missile. After firing the launcher can be reloaded within an hour. The system can be moved and not mobile, as it can be moved to another prepared site, but it can not be set up anywhere.

Green Pine

The "Green Pine" is active active array scan (AESA) solid state radar that operates in L bands in the 500 MHz to 1,000 MHz, or 1,000 MHz to 2,000 MHz range. It operates in search, detection, tracking, and missile modes simultaneously. It is capable of detecting targets in the range of up to 500 km (310 mi) and is capable of tracking more than 30 targets at speeds in excess of 3,000 m/s (10,000 ft/dt). The radar illuminates the target and guides the Arrow missile into 4 m (13 ft) away from the target.

Super Green Pine

Advanced version of the radar, called "Super Green Pine", "Green Pine" Block-B, or "Great Pine" (Hebrew: ?????? ? ?, pronounced [o? en adi?] ), is to replace the original "Green Pine In 2008 both versions were active. " Super Green Pine "extends detection range of up to about 800-900 km (500-560Ã, mi.) More sophisticated improvements of Super Green Pine are under development.

Golden Citron

The "Golden Citron" (Hebrew: ??????? ?, pronounced [et? o? zahav] ) open net-centric system architecture installed in the truck Management, Control, Communications & amp; The Intelligence Center can control up to 14 intercepts simultaneously. In 2007 it is one of the most advanced net-centric systems in the world. The system provides fully automated and Human-in-the-Loop options at every stage of combat operations management. It is also capable of interoperability with other theater missile defense systems and C 3 systems. I. Primarily Link 16, TADIL-J, communications are being modified to allow interoperability with the Patriot fire control unit. The assigned target can be submitted to the Patriot AN/MPQ-53 fire control radar. Tests conducted by the US and Israel have successfully connected Arrow with Patriot versions of the US and Israel.

The "Citron Tree" has three operator console banks that are arranged in U shape. In the officer's sitting center in command that oversees the engagement, but also has links to other parts of the battery as well as to the IAF headquarters. On the commander's right is the engagement officer, who ensures that the target is assigned to another engagement officer sitting on U's right foot. Each is given a geographical area to be retained and two more senior officers because they have an overview of Patriot batteries. To the left of the commander is the resource officer, who monitors the status and readiness of the missile. To the left of U sit the sky image officer, who comes into contact with Home Front Command and uses the center's ability to predict impact points to alert civil authorities. Also on this console is an intelligence officer and an after-action/prosecution officer, who uses the recording because it is impossible to absorb all the information during the engagement. Overall, "Golden Citron" is manned by 7-10 operators.

Hazelnut Chocolate

"Brown Hazelnut" (Hebrew: ???? ??? ?, pronounced [e? Oz? Um] ) the launch control center is located at the launch site, up to 300 km (190 million) from the" Golden Citron "fire control center. It uses microwaves and radio data and voice communications to "Green Pine" and "Golden Citron". The launch method is the vertical heat launch of the sealed tube, providing all-azimuth coverage. "Brown Hazelnut" also has missile maintenance and diagnostic capabilities.

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Production

Israel originally produced the Arrow system domestically, but on February 11, 2003 the IAI and Boeing signed an agreement, valued at over $ 25 million for the fiscal year 2003-2004, to build a production facility for the manufacture of components for Arrow missiles in the United States.. In March 2004, IAI awarded a $ 78 million production contract to Boeing; the total contract value could exceed $ 225 million until the second quarter of 2008. As a result of the successful execution of this contract, Boeing is responsible for producing about 35 percent of Arrow missile components, including electronic parts, booster and missile tube cases, at Huntsville, Alabama facility. IAI, the main contractor of the Arrow system, is responsible for the integration and assembly of the last Arrow missiles in Israel. Boeing also coordinates the production of Arrow missile components produced by over 150 American companies located in more than 25 states. Boeing sent its first Arrow 2 interceptor to Israel in 2005. The jointly produced interceptors have been tested since February 12, 2007. The final shipment to the Israeli Air Force is planned by the end of 2010.

The other main contractors are:

  • Elta - produces radar "Green Pine"/"Super Green Pine";
  • Elisra - produces "Golden Citron" C 3 I Center;
  • Rafael Advanced Defense Systems - produces propulsion and warhead motors;
  • Israel Military Industries - produce motor booster;
  • Alliant Techsystems - generates first-stage motors and nozzle cases;
  • Lockheed Martin - produces an active radar seeker;
  • Raytheon - produces infrared locator;
  • Ceradyne - produces ceramic radomes.

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Implementation

According to the original 1986 schedule, the Arrow system was supposed to enter operational services in 1995. The first operational Arrow battery was deployed, but in March 2000 at Palmachim Airbase, near the town of Rishon LeZion, south of Tel Aviv's metropolitan area.. It was declared operational in October 2000, and reached its full capacity in March 2001. The second battery deployment at Ein Shemer (Ein Shemer Airfield), near the town of Hadera, Haifa District, northern Israel, was delayed by strong opposition from local residents who feared radar would be dangerous for their health. The situation was finally resolved and the second Israeli battery completed its deployment, changed operationally and connected with the first battery in October 2002. In 2007 the IDF has reportedly decided to modify the missile defense doctrine and to counter the possibility of Syrian and Iranian missile attacks and quietly modify Arrow's deployment at Northern Israel.

IDF plans to buy 50-100 interceptors for each battery. In 1998, the battery was estimated to cost about $ 170 million. In 2012, a radar of "Great Pine" was reported alongside two Green Pine radar.

Israel initially planned to use two Arrow 2 batteries but has since searched and won funding promises for a third battery. Some reports suggest that the third battery has been deployed, or in development in the south, while others claim that decisions about third battery placement have not been made, even though it is being discussed for service entries in 2012. Other reports state that Israel plans not to use any , but two additional Arrow 2 batteries to defend the country's south, also include sensitive sites such as the Negev Nuclear Research Center. But the decision about the third battery was taken in October 2010. New batteries are expected to be used operational by 2012 in the country center. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, some sources indicate that the new Arrow 2 battery starts operating in 2012 at the Israeli Air Force facility in Tal Shahar, about halfway between Jerusalem and Ashdod, near Beit Shemesh.

Export

Apart from Israel, no country buys a full Arrow system, although India has acquired and deployed three radar "Green Pine" in August 2005. The Indian government has been trying to buy the Arrow system since 1999, but in early 2002 the US vetoed Israel's request. to sell Arrow 2 missiles to India, using its rights as a major funder. US officials are of the opinion that sales will violate Missile Industrial Control Regime (MTCR). Although Arrow 2 may reach the range of 300 km (190 mi), it is designed to cut in the shorter range, and it is unclear whether it can carry a 500 kg (1,100 pound) charge to this range specified in MTCR.. In 2011 once again an Indian Army official said that Arrow 2 may be part of India's missile defense solutions.

Turkey also plans to buy anti-missile defense systems worth more than $ 1 billion. Arrow is regarded as an opponent candidate, but rejected for political reasons. In the past, Britain, Japan, and Singapore were referred to as prospective foreign customers of the Arrow system. The Netherlands reportedly expressed interest in the center of "Golden Citron" C 3 I in November 1999.

In the late 1990s Jordanian officials have expressed concern that any turmoil between Israel and Iraq or Iran will affect its territory. The problem becomes more difficult for Jordan when his warhead is unconventional. Therefore, Benjamin Netanyahu, during his first term as Prime Minister of Israel, reportedly offered Jordan "Arrow 2 defense umbrella". Without allowing Israel to continue deploying arrows close to the Iraqi border, another option is Israel to sell the Jordan the Arrow system. This is most likely what Netanyahu's Prime Minister means above. In May 1999 Israel reportedly requested US approval to sell Arrow batteries to Jordan, but apparently no consent was granted.

Armed with marketing approval by their respective governments, the US-Israeli industrial team plans to offer the Arrow system to South Korea. Potential deal, estimated to exceed $ 1 billion.

For the United States, Arrow has provided important technical and operational data. It remains a key element in the Missile Defense Agency's plans for a layered missile defense architecture, and examples of successful and affordable programs. But at the moment, the United States has no plans to acquire and deploy Arrow. Nevertheless, in September 2009 the Arrow system was mentioned by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and then Deputy Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright of Among alternatives to US missile defense assets in Europe. The Arrow system is being incorporated into US anti-ballistic capabilities in Europe, they said.

In a June 2011 interview, Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly said that Arrow 2 would be integrated into the US-planned regional defense ranks in the Middle East. According to the interview, it can also protect the Arab countries which are allies of the US but with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. In October 2015, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have become interested in providing the Arrow system for themselves.

Israel begins concept work on Arrow-4 defender
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Operational history

Source of the article : Wikipedia

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